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Whatever a language allows its speakers to express - it usually provides 
them with more than one way to express it. Thus, one and the same 
historical fact may be stated in an active and a passive variant: 
(1a) In 1453, the Turks conquered Constantinopel. 
(1b) In 1453, Constantinopel was conquered by the Turks. 
The fact reported by these two sentences is the same; still, there is a 
difference in the way in which it is ‘presented’. Another familiar variation 
concerns word order: 
(2a) In 1453, the Turks conquered Constantinopel. 
(2b) The Turks conquered Constantinopel in 1453. 
Again, the historical fact is the same. But it seems that these two sentences 
answer two different questions; whereas (2a) is perfectly appropriate in 
answer to ‘What happened in 1453?’, this is not the case for (2b); it is not 
fully excluded, but somewhat odd, whereas it makes a perfect answer to 
‘When did the Turks conquer Constantinopel?’. Somehow, the adverbial in 
1453 plays a different role in these alternative sentences: in (2a) it is 
somehow presupposed, and the real answer to the question is the remainder 
of the clause, the action of the Turks. In (2b), it is the direct answer to the 
question - what was asked for is the date; it is more ‘in focus’ than in (2a). 
Another pair of variants is this: 
(3a) In 1453, the Turks conquered Constantinopel. 
(3b) In 1453, the Turks were conquering Constantinopel. 
In this case, the formal difference is not so very much in syntax but in 
morphology, and this variation, again, is accompanied by a slightly different 
way in which the same event is presented: in (3b), we are somehow placed 
within this event - they are just doing it -, whereas in (3a), it is presented 
more as a completed fact. 
In all of these cases, the expression is a finite clause. English also 
offers possibilities to express the very fact in an entirely different 
construction, as in (4): 
(4a) Constantinopel’s conquest by the Turks in 1453 
(4b) The Turks’ conquest of Constantinopel in 1453 
(4c) Constantinopel, which was conquered by the Turks in 1453 
In these three cases, the construction is no longer a full sentence but rather a 
complex nounphrase. It is hard to tell what precisely the difference between 
them is - but there is clearly a difference. 
It is easy to come up with many other variants in which the same 
historical event can be put into words. But the point to be made here should 
be clear: in one and the same situation, and with respect to one and the 
same fact, there are numerous ways of expressing it. These variants are in a 
way equivalent; but they are not entirely equivalent; there are sometimes 
subtle, sometimes substantial differences, and it is at the speaker’s 
discretion to choose between them. 
In all examples discussed so far, the speaker’s choice is between 
various structural options. There are also lexical options: depending on the 
lexical wealth of the language, the speaker may select between various 
words when describing the same fact; he may replace Turks by Osmans, or 
Constantinopel by former Byzantium or by Istanbul, or conquered by more 
prosaic took. Again, these options are equivalent in one way, but not in 
another, and it is left to the speaker to opt for the one or the other. 
Lexical choice and structural choice reflect elementary properties of 
natural language. Whatever precise form a language may have, it inevitably 
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has a repertoire of elementary meaning-bearing expressions (words or 
morphemes), on the one hand, and rules which allow the construction of 
complex expressions from elementary ones, on the other: a language 
consists of a lexicon and a morphosyntax. There is a third type of choice 
which is perhaps less obvious but no less deeply rooted in the nature of 
human language. In general, the interpretation of an utterance is fed by two 
sources of information - by linguistic information proper, or ‘expression 
information’, and by contextual information. The former stems from what is 
in the words and in the way in which these are combined. The latter may be 
of various types. It may come from what has been said before, it may stem 
from the perceptual situation, or it may be part of the interlocutor’s world 
knowledge. All of this is familiar, and the reason why it is mentioned here 
is that this permanent interplay between expression information and context 
information provides the speaker, when talking about something, with a 
third choice: he must decide what is made explicit by his expression and 
what is left to contextual information. In all sentences above, for example, 
the temporal adverbial in 1453 may be replaced with then, at that time, soon 
afterwards, four hundred and forty-seven years ago and other phrases, 
which (in a given context!) express the same information. Hence, we have a 
third type of choice, to be labeled here contextual choice. 
Very often, these three forms of choice are not independent. Often, 
a particular form of contextual choice must be expressed by a particular 
word; deictical and anaphorical constructions illustrate the point. Similarly, 
the selection of a particular lexical item may constrain the syntactic 
constructions between which a speaker may choose; some verbs, for 
example, have a passive, whereas others do not; some pronouns ('clitic 
elements') are restricted to particular positions and hence exclude certain 
word order patterns, etc. But this regular interaction does not affect the 
general point to be made here. Whenever a speaker wants to produce an 
utterance in a particular language, he has to decide between various options 
with which this language provides him. In particular, he has a lexical 
choice, a structural choice, and a contextual choice. In each of these, the 
alternatives between which he has to choose are equivalent in one way, but 
not equivalent in another way. His eventual decision, therefore, reflects a 
particular way of presenting what he wants to say - it reflects a particular 
‘perspective’ on the facts stated. If we want to understand the phenomenon 
of ‘perspective taking’ in language, we must analyse how these three types 
of choice function in language production. 
This is perhaps not the most common way to approach the problem 
of perspective and perspectivation in language. We have chosen it here for 
three closely interrelated reasons. First, there is a number of fields in which 
the notion of perspective has a relatively clear definition, for example in 
mathematics, in visual perception, and maybe in the history of art. In its 
application to language, however, it has a strong metaphorical character, 
with all advantages and disadvantages of metaphorical extension: it deals 
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with an important phenomenon, it captures crucial insights, but it is not 
clearly defined, and it misses what is specific to language. Take, for 
example, a core notion such as ‘viewpoint’. In visual perception, this notion 
is comparatively well-defined - it is the spatial position at which the 
observer is, or imagines to be. In language, this notion of viewpoint also 
plays a role, for example in the use of deictic terms such as left, right, here, 
etc. This, however, is only a special case. It is much less clear what 
‘viewpoint’ means, for example, in the comparatively well-studied case of 
(grammaticalised) aspect. Verbal aspect is a category found in many, if not 
most, languages. The difference between simple form and expanded form, 
as in The Turks conquered Constantinopel vs The Turks were conquering 
Constantinopel (cf. example 3 above) illustrates this category. Linguists 
normally characterise different aspects, as ‘various ways of viewing the 
situation’ and similar characterisations (Comrie 1976). In fact, the linguistic 
term ‘aspect’ is a translation of Russian vid’ ‘view’. But clearly, this notion 
of viewpoint cannot mean two different concrete places from which 
something is seen. In the case of ‘viewpoint aspect’, the concrete position of 
speaker, listener, or any other person, plays no role at all, nor is anything 
‘seen’ differently, if this word is understood in its literal sense. In example 
3a, b nothing is seen at all. Even more problematic are cases in which the 
difference between the use of active and passive, or varying subjective 
evaluations of what is expressed, are accounted for in terms of ‘viewpoint’. 
This is a very suggestive and intuitively appealing way to give the ‘flavour’ 
of the difference; but it can only be a starting point for an explanation 
proper of what is going on in these cases. Such an explanation must be 
specific to the particular cognitive domain in which the phenomenon of 
perspective and perspective taking is observed. It would be more 
appropriate, therefore, to talk about 'V-perspective' and 'V-perspectivation’ 
(V for ‘visual’), on the one hand, and ‘L-perspective’ and ‘L-
perspectivation’ (L for language),on the other. It is the latter we are dealing 
with here. This does not preclude that there are many similarities; but 
simply talking about ‘perspective’ obliterates the differences - and these are 
not minor. This already has brought us to the second point, discussed 
below. 
The principles of perspective-taking are in many ways different 
when language comes into play. Someone may see a tree from various 
perspectives, he may draw a tree from various perspectives, and he may 
describe a tree from various perspectives. In the two former cases, the 
difference in perspective is essentially determined by the nature of our 
perception. In the latter case, it is determined by highly abstract cognitive 
principles which determine the choice of words and constructions against 
the background of shared assumptions among the interlocutors. Now, this 
example is relatively simple because the common element, the tree, is a 
physical object. But perspective-taking in language goes far beyond this 
case. In examples 1-4 above, the common element which is presented from 
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various perspectives, is a historical event; hence, it is a much more abstract 
entity than, for example, a tree which can indeed be seen, drawn, and 
described from different angles. And there are still more abstract cases in 
which the intuitive notion of perspective-taking in language makes sense, 
for example arguments or instructions. In all of these cases, however, the 
principles of perspective-taking are much the same; they are constraints on 
choices, in particular the ones mentioned above. 
Third, L-perspectivation is a highly complex, active process which 
involves a series of interrelated decisions on many levels. This is already 
obvious for the elementary constructions 1-4 above. But in actual fact, the 
production of such a sentence is normally part of a longer communicative 
task, in which the speaker transforms selected elements of his knowledge 
into concrete sound waves. In each phase of this process, the speaker is 
permanently faced with a multitude of choices. In our example, we have 
assumed that it is already clear what ‘the fact’ to be talked about is - here 
the conquest of Constantinopel in the year of 1453. But the decision to talk 
about something specific is, or at least maybe, one of the many choices 
which the speaker has to take. This becomes clearer if we look at typical 
communicative situations in which a speaker is challenged to produce a 
specific text. Suppose, for example, someone is asked by a passer-by: ‘How 
do I get from here to the station?’. If the interlocutor takes on this task and 
sets out to fulfil it by verbal means, then he may be able to do so by 
producing a single sentence. But as a rule, he will produce an ensemble of 
well-organised sentences, that is, a text. An essential part of this process is 
the decision about which information is to be selected for verbalisation, and 
which part of this selected information is to be packed into a single 
sentence. Only then does it make sense to ask what structural form this 
sentence should have and which lexical items it is to contain. Hence, the 
question of perspectivisation crops on very different levels, and on each of 
these levels, it takes a slightly different form. What is constant, though, is 
the idea that there is always a set of alternatives, which are equivalent in 
one way and not equivalent in another. The question which we will address 
in the main part of this chapter is now: Are there overarching principles 
which determine, or at least influence, the speaker’s choice and hence the 
particular perspective which he takes in his production? 
The fact that the choice, on whichever level, is always a task of the 
speaker does not mean that the listener has no role in this process. In fact, 
he may even ‘set the stage’ by posing a particular question, which the 
speaker then has to answer. The example of the route directions question 
above illustrates the point. Even if there is no explicit question of this sort, 
the speaker may behave as if there were such a question and a particular 
listener, or group of listeners, who asks it. As we shall see later, the 
particular - implicit or explicit - question which the speaker sets out to 
answer is a core constraint on possible perspectives. It should be clear, 
however, that it is still left to the speaker how he deals with such a question. 
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He may not accept it at all, he may accept it but ignore some of the 
constraints which it imposes on his production, and even if he accepts it in 
its entirety, the question still leaves him with many degrees of freedom as 
regards the various choices he has to make. This will be discussed in 
sections 3-6 of this chapter. It will be useful to begin, however, with a brief 
look at the various stages of the production process and the way in which 
the speaker can go the one or the other way. 
2. Levels in production 
There is considerable theoretical and empirical work on human language 
production. In this section, we shall not try to review this work (see, for 
example, Levelt 1989 and Herrmann and Grabowski 1994), but briefly 
discuss some elementary facts which every theory must deal with. It will be 
helpful to use a simple example. Suppose someone was involved in a traffic 
accident and is then asked on some occasion to speak about what happened 
during this accident. Then, at least the following four cognitive levels may 
play a role in L-perspectivation. 
a. Intake 
The underlying event itself, the traffic accident in this example, is a 
complex agglomeration of individual facts and incidents, of persons and 
objects involved, of temporal, spatial and causal relations. Only some of 
these are perceived and stored by the individual participants. The process 
which leads from the ‘objective situation’ to the particular mental 
representation which an individual forms of this situation is in many ways 
‘perspective-driven’. The most obvious source of selection is given by the 
fact that the perceiver has only restricted sensory access to this situation; he 
has a particular ‘viewpoint’ in the literal sense of the word: 
In correspondance of the bodily nature of the perceiving and acting 
subject, the objects of experience are only present in those aspects that are 
seen from the spatiotemporal point of view taken by the subject. To be 
present in aspects with respect to a given viewpoint is the basic meaning of 
perspective. (Graumann 1989: 96) 
But there are many other factors which govern the way in which a mental 
representation is built up. They range from very general principles that 
determine the cognitive processing of visual and other sensory input to 
highly subjective preferences for one or the other aspect of the situation. 
Some features of a situation are perceptually more salient than others and 
hence more likely to be noticed and stored. There are social conventions on 
what is more and what is less relevant in such a situation. These 
conventions may be culture-specific, they may be specific to a particular 
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speech community or social group. And finally, there are subjective 
preferences which depend on the individual’s personal history, her interests, 
his momentary emotional disposition, etc. 
The perspectival nature of the intake is not necessarily related to 
how this situation is later presented in a verbal account. At that point, 
language plays a role only insofar as particular properties of a language may 
influence the oberver’s attention. Thus, a deictic system which does not 
discriminate between ‘left’ and ‘right’, ‘front’ and ‘back’ may lead the 
observer to ignore certain aspects of the spatial arrangement, or to give 
them less weight than a system of spatial reference which depends on the 
position of the speaker (see Levinson 1997). But the existence and the 
weight of such factors is arguable, and to the extent to which they exist, 
they are surely weak. In general, the intake is not an active process based on 
linguistic knowledge; it should rather be seen as a language-indepencent 
filter which rules out certain features of the situation and lets others pass. 
But obviously, this particular filtering has strong consequences for what can 
later be selected in text generation. It creates the knowledge basis on which 
the speaker can draw. The clearest case is surely the ‘initial vantage point’ 
with which it provides the participant: a time and a position, which then 
later may surface in the participant’s account of this situation, for example 
in form of a particular ‘topic time’ (see section 4.3 below). 
b. Update 
Normally, some time elapes between intake and text generation. In the 
course of this time, the original representation is in many ways transformed 
in the observer’s memory. Certain features are dropped, others are added, 
some features may change their relative weight, they might gain or loose 
certain emotional connotations, moral evaluations are added that were 
absent from the original representation, certain observations may be re-
interpreted in the light of later experiences, or due to what other parties say 
about the situation etc etc. This steady transformation is not arbitrary. It 
depends on a wealth of factors, ranging from very general properties of 
human memory to highly specific and subjective preferences of the 
individual. Hence, this permanent update may also be considered to be 
‘perspective-driven’. But then, the original, non-metaphorical meaning of 
this notion is largely lost and replaced with an understanding of perspective, 
that is highly suggestive but much less well-defined; we might speak here 
of ‘M-perspectivation’ (M for memory), in contrast to V-perspectivation 
and L-perspectivation. Again, there is no reason to assume that language 
plays a substantial role in this updating. But its eventual result restricts the 
available knowledge on which the speaker can base his text generation. 
c. Forming a Discourse Representation 
In a specific communicative situation, the speaker sets out to verbalise part 
of what he has stored in memory. This is the point where language, and 
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hence L-perspectivation, comes in. Very often, text generation is initiated 
by a particular question which the speaker is supposed to answer, for 
example: ‘What did you see?’ or ‘What did the truck that came from the left 
side look like?’ or ‘What did you do yourself?’ or ‘Have you ever been in 
danger of life?’. There need not be such an explicit question; the speaker 
may simply want to speak, for one reason or another, about what he 
experienced some time ago; in a way, he is posing such a question to 
himself. In each case, however, there is a particular communicative goal 
that causes the speaker to activate his updated mental representation and to 
create a new, temporary conceptual structure, a discourse representation 
(other labels are conceptual structure, preverbal message, and similar 
ones). It is this discourse representation which underlies the concrete text to 
be produced by the speaker. The discourse representation differs in four 
crucial respects from the final representation in memory: 
Selection. The discourse representation contains only selected parts of the 
entire representation. This selection is determined, or at least constrained, 
by the particular communicative goal. Selection not only concerns which 
bits and pieces of the original representation are chosen for verbalisation at 
all but also at which level of ‘granularity’ these are to be put into words. 
Thus, the speaker may decide to give only a very global account of some 
subevents but go into much more detail for other subevents, or to begin 
with a global account and then refine it, etc. 
Addition. Typically, the material contained in the discourse representation 
includes bits and pieces of information which stem from other sources than 
from what the speaker has stored about the original situation. He may add 
comparisons, try to give explanations, relate the particular subevents or 
participants to other events or persons, include moral and other evaluations, 
etc. 
Linearisation. Somehow, the various conceptual units which belong to the 
discourse representation must be sequentially ordered. In some cases, this 
is comparatively easy; narratives often reflect a simple temporal order of 
subevents. But as a rule, linearisation is much more problematic. Already in 
the case of a car accident, subevents may overlap or be completely 
simultaneous, and then, the speaker has to make a choice what to represent 
first. It may also be that the level of granularity is not kept constant, for 
example if the speaker chooses to give first a rough account and then go 
into more detail with some of the subevents. In this case, there is is still a 
temporal ordering, which provides a natural base for linearisation. Other 
cognitive representations do not involve such a linear order, for example in 
the case of a picture description or a logical argument. In these cases, the 
speakers may choose very different ‘perspectives’, under which the entire 
information to be verbalised is put into sequential order (see, e.g., Levelt 
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1982). 
Function assignment. There is good reason to assume that already before 
the decision on the final language-specific form is taken, various bits of 
information are marked for special linguistic features. This includes, for 
example, the decision whether a certain entity - person or object - should be 
encoded as the subject or as the object, whether an active or passive way of 
presentation is chosen, what belongs to the topic component and what 
belongs to the focus component of the final utterance, etc. Form and 
amount of this marking are much at dispute, and in order to keep it different 
from the eventual language-specific marking of, for example, the 
grammatical subject or the passive form of the verb, we called it here 
‘function assignment’. 
All four properties are the result of continuous ‘perspectival’ 
choices. This is obvious for both aspects of selection: the speaker weighs 
the various elements from his stored knowledge representation and decides 
which ones to include and on which level of granularity. Note, however, 
that this decision does not reflect what has been called ‘contextual choice’ 
in section 1. Contextual choice is the speaker’s decision about what is 
explicitly stated and what is left implicit because the speaker assumes 
that the listener can infer it from context. Hence, it presupposes that the 
speaker wants that the listener eventually has this information. Selection 
concerns the speaker’s decision which information in which detail the 
listener should have due to his, the speaker’s, efforts. It is an adaptation to 
the listener - but not in the sense that the speaker plans his text such that it 
fits the listener’s contextual knowledge. 
Analoguous considerations apply for addition. The extent to which 
the speaker wants to provide the listener with subjective comments and 
evaluations on the event, for example, is surely a matter of his ‘subjective 
perspective’ on this event. They may be very different, for example, if he is 
the victim of the traffic accident, a policeman or simply a bystander, they 
may be different if he is a passionate bike-driver, if he has a driving-license 
or not, if he had a car accident himself before, etc etc. But all of this has 
nothing directly to do with L-perspectivation. 
The speaker may also choose different linearisation strategies; he 
may prefer, in the case of the traffic accident, to follow a strictly temporal 
order wherever this is possible. But he may also choose to tell the events 
backwards, as seen from the result, and then explain how this result came 
about. Similarly, he is free to choose where to plug in additional 
information, such as comments or background statements. Again, one may 
call this choice perspectival, but it should be clear that this, again, is a 
different notion of perspective. 
The situation is much more difficult with respect to function 
assigment, because the speaker’s decision here immediately affects the 
choice of what to express in which concrete way. The decision, for 
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example, to present a particular participant of the situation as an agent, 
rather than as a patient, is a ‘structural choice’, in the sense of section 1. 
Similarly, the decision to assign certain subparts of the information to the 
topic component and other subparts to the focus component of the utterance 
immediately affects the structure of this utterance. Another decision taken 
at this point is the fixation of a particular ‘origo’, i.e., vantage point to 
which times and spaces are related and which is then reflected in the 
utterance by the choice of particular words, such as the deictic terms left, 
right, here etc. or by particular tense forms. The problem is here that, 
whatever the speaker’s decisions are, they can be implemented in various 
ways in the final utterance. The speaker may be able, for example, to 
transform the same - or essentially the same - discourse representation into 
an English, a German or a French sentence. Or if he chooses his own 
position as the spatial origo, he is still free to say here or where I was or at 
my position.This has already brought us to the last level of text generation -
the level in which eventual perspectival decisions are transposed to 
linguistic form. 
d. Constructing a linguistic form 
Whatever the discourse represention is - any language provides their 
speakers with very specific possibilities to implement it. The discourse 
representation may fix that a certain element belongs to the topic 
information; still, there are various ways in which this is marked - by 
intonation, by word order, by the choice of a particular particle which 
indicates the information status of some element. Similarly the discourse 
representation may have fixed that some subevent is presented as on-going, 
rather than as completed. Metaphorically speaking, the speaker puts 
himself, and wants to put the listener, ‘into the situation’, rather than seeing 
it from the outside. Then, he has still an option between, for example, a 
particular verbal aspect, an adverbial, or a combination of these verbal 
means. As was already said in the preceding section, it is very difficult to 
say to which extent the decision about the eventual form are determined by 
the formation of the discourse representation itself or by its translation in a 
concrete linguistic form, and opinions vary considerably on this point. 
Bierwisch and Schreuder (1992), for example, assume that the discourse 
representation - their ‘conceptual structure’ - is neutral with respect to the 
final linguistic form; as a consequence, it is the same no matter in which 
language the speaker wants to express it. Under such an assumption, there 
is no ‘function assigment’ in the discourse representation, as has been 
assumed here. We shall not discuss this point in detail (see von Stutterheim 
1997, chapter 9). It seems clear, however, that there are intermediate stages 
between a language-neutral cognitive representation of what is to be 
expressed, on the one hand, and the final linguistic form, on the other. The 
precise number and nature of these interim stages is a matter of dispute. It 
may well be that there is no fixed set of levels at all but that actual 
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production is much more flexible, depending on the nature of the particular 
communicative task and maybe even the speaker’s competence. We shall 
not try to sort this out here. The crucial point in the present context is this: It 
is exactly this passage within the entire text generation at which L-
perspectising comes in. 
So far, we have given numerous examples which illustrate structural 
choice, lexical choice and contextual choice; others can easily added. In 
fact, a great deal of the literature on perspective-taking in language consists 
of very striking examples and anecdotical evidence for this. But are there 
any principles which determine this part of the process - in other words, are 
there any general constraints that which are characteristic of L-
perspectivation? This is the question which we will address in the next 
section, 
3. The Quaestio 
3.1 Questions and answers 
What causes a speaker to activate parts of this stored knowledge, build a 
discourse representation and transform it into sound waves? In the easiest 
case, this is done by an explicit question on the part of some interlocutor. In 
the case of a traffic accident, such a question might be, for example ‘Which 
car came from the left?’ This question defines, within limits, the 
communicative task to be solved. The speaker may choose to answer it 
simply with a single sentence or even a part of such a sentence, for example 
(5) A BMW 730 came from the left. 
(6) A BMW 730. 
What he is asked for by the question, is the specification of some entity. 
The question raises a set of alternatives - all those x’s that could have come 
from the left on that occasion, and the speaker is challenged to select one of 
those - the one which really came from the left on that occasion. In other 
words, the question defines a choice, and it is up to the speaker to deal with 
this choice. In doing so, he is left with a certain amount of freedom. It is 
this freedom which allows the speaker, if he takes on the task at all, to set a 
particular perspective: the question imposes constraints on a possible 
answer - but it does not determine the answer, of course. In particular, the 
speaker may choose to go into more detail with respect to the predicates he 
is asked to specify, and may answer the question by a whole series of 
interconnected utterances - i.e., with a text: 
(7) From my position, I could not see it very well. Everything 
went so fast. But it was a big car, a limousine; blue, dark 
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blue. One of my neighbours had such a car. I guess it must 
be very expensive, one of these old-fashioned fossils... 
Not all utterances in such a sequence are directly ‘to the point’, which is, 
here, to contribute to the specification of the object. The first utterance in 7, 
for example, highlights the role of the speaker’s position in the intake phase 
and thus explicitly introduces a perspectival component. At the same time, 
it qualifies the reliability of the description: it has not only a spatial but also 
a modalising component. Clearly, such information can be relevant and 
important; but it does not directly serve to answer the question. We shall 
call those utterances which directly contribute to answering the question, its 
‘main structure’, and those which give additional - and communicately 
often important - material, its ‘side structures’. Side structures can be of 
various type - comments, evaluations, background information, etc. Thus, 
they are a rich source of perspectivation in one sense of the word (vf. 
Sandig 1996). For for the speaker, they may even be more important than 
main structure utterances, because they allow him to express his own 
subjective attitude. But note that this is one way in which the text reflects a 
particular perspective. What counts as main structure, and what as side 
structure, directly depends on the specific question which the text as a 
whole intends to answer. In the example, the speaker is asked to specify a 
particular object. Had the question been ‘What happened next with the car 
that came from the left?’, then the categorization as main or side structure 
would have been the reverse. In that case, the speaker's task would have 
been to specify a sequence of small events, which in its entirety constitutes 
a subpart ot the entire traffic accident; and this sequence of subevents 
would then comprise the main structure of the text, its ‘foreground’. Any 
other material - for example a more detailed description of a car, or of some 
other vehicle involved in the events - would belong to the side structures, or 
‘background’, of the text. The concepts ‘foreground’ and ‘background’, are 
normally not introduces in this way but rather in terms of whether or not 
they are a ‘narrative sequence’. It should be clear, however, that the 
background-foreground partitioning in narration is only a special case of a 
much more general phenomenon: they reflect various reactions to the 
underlying question. 
There is a second important feature of ‘textual answers’ to a 
question. If the entire information is distributed over a series of several 
utterances, then certain meaning components within each utterance are 
maintained from the preceding utterance (or utterances), while other 
meaning components are freshly introduced. In this example, there is only 
one crucial entity referred to, the car; it is introduced in the question itself 
and then merely maintained in the subsequent utterances of the main 
structure. Had there been more than one vehicle, the related question, 
‘Where did the the cars come from?’ would have forced the speaker into a 
much more complicated pattern of referent introduction and maintenance. 
12 
Objects and persons, in brief, the referents of noun phrases, are not 
the only meaning elements that must be introduced or maintained across 
utterances. Temporal intervals and subspaces are others. Again, this 
crucially depends on the nature of the initial question. A question such as 
‘What did the car look like?’ leaves time and space constant across the text 
- more precisely, across the main structure utterances of the text. A question 
such as ‘What did you observe?’, by contrast, normally invites regular 
switches in the spatial and temporal domain. Such a question provides the 
speaker with more degrees of freedom how to organise his discourse 
representation and how to put it into words. 
Thus, a coherent text that is produced as an answer to a question 
involves a ‘referential movement’ within various semantic domains (or, as 
we shall say here ‘referential domains’), such as persons, place, time, and 
others. This referential movement is reflected in the use of specific 
linguistic means - it immediately influences the speaker’s lexical, structural 
and contextual choice. 
Summing up, the structure of a text, is systematically constrained by 
the nature of the question which the text in its entirety is produced to 
answer. These constraints include: 
a. the partitioning of the text into main structure and side structures; 
b. the assignment of specific meaning elements to the topic component or to 
the focus of a main structure utterance; 
c. the ‘filling’ of various possible domains of reference within each main 
structure utterance; 
d. the referential movement within the domains from one main structure 
utterance to the next. 
They narrow down the choices of the speaker, if he takes on the 
communicative task - but they leave him certain degrees of freedom, and 
thus various ways to ‘present his case’. It is this fact which allows the 
speaker to impose an L-perspective on what he sets out to say. We shall 
explain this in some more detail in sections 3.2 - 3.4 below. 
Not all texts are sollicited by an explicit question. People sometimes 
take the liberty to speak without being asked, or, to put it alternatively, they 
define their own questions. In other words, the question which underlies the 
production of an utterance or a longer text may be explicitly asked, or it 
may be implicitly given - either by the speaker himself, or just because the 
situation is such that it suggests a particular question to be answered. We 
shall use the term quaestio for both cases - a real question in a real 
dialogue, or an implicit question with a similar function. This idea is not 
new; in fact, it is already found in ancient rhetoric, although its structural 
consequences on the concrete form of texts and individual utterances have 
hardly ever been a concrete object of investigation in the rhetorical tradition 
(for a discussion, see von Stutterheim1997, chapter two). 
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As was said above, the quaestio imposes certain constraints on the 
speaker’s answer, providing him at the same time with a limited set of 
options among which he can choose. In no case is the speaker bound to 
obey these constraints. If he does not, then this either leads to side 
structures - for the entire text - or to particular rhetorical effects. In what 
follows, we shall discuss constraints b. - d. in some more detail (the 
constraint which leads to a partitioning in ‘foreground’ and ‘background’ 
was already discussed above. 
3.2 Topic component and focus component 
In general, an utterance can be used to answer very different questions. 
Consider, for example 7, which could be part of an account of the traffic 
accident: 
(7) The bike came from the left. 
Such an utterance could be made in answer to: 
(8) What came from the left? 
(9) Where did the bike came from? 
(10) What happened? 
(11) What happened next? 
In each of these cases, sentence 7 settles an open alternative raised 
by the question - it specifies one out of a set of candidates at issue. In 8, the 
alternative to be settled includes those entities - vehicles, as the context 
suggests - that could have come from the left at that time; and the one is 
selected among the various possible candidates is ‘the bike’. In 9, the 
possibilities include all the places where the bike could have come from, 
and what is selected is a the particular place described by from the left. In 
10, the choice is between all those events that could have happened, and 
what is selected is the particular event of the bike coming from the left. In 
11, the alternative raised is very similar to 10, but the time is explicitly 
restricted: what is asked for are the events that could have happened at 
some time after the time of a previous event, and one of those is selected 
and specified in the answer. 
In all of these cases, we have an alternative set by the question, and 
an element from this alternative that is specified in the answer. Such an 
alternative at issue will be called the ‘topic’ of the utterance, and the 
element from that alternative which is chosen and specified, the ‘focus’ of 
the utterance. Topic and focus, as these terms are used here, are components 
of the ‘meaning’ of an utterance - a person, an action, a time span. They are 
not the verbal means - a word or an entire construction - which express this 
meaning. When talking about a speaker’s choice in the production process, 
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we must carefully distinguish between the choice of, for example, a person 
he wants to talk about, and the choice between various ways to do this. Both 
decisions may reflect a particular form of ‘perpectivation’; but only the 
latter is what is understood here to be L-perspectivation, i.e., the 
combination of contextual, structural and lexical choice. 
It is also important to distinguish between the expression of a topic 
or focus, on the one hand, and the marking that that entity ‘is’ topic or 
focus, on the other. In 7, when said in answer to 8, the focus is the bike, and 
this focus is referred to by the expression the bike. With a different 
contextual choice, it could also have been expressed by that bike or by it. Its 
focal status is marked by intonation. Intonation is not the only device 
available to make clear what the focus (or the topic) is; word order or 
specific particles serve also as devices for this, at least in some languages. 
Very often, however, it is not explicitly marked at all, or is ambiguous. 
Note, finally, that the distinction between topic and focus must not 
be confused with the distinction between ‘given’ or ‘maintained’ 
information, on the one hand, and ‘new’ or ‘introduced’ information, on 
the other, although these dichotomies may often coincide. Consider, for 
example, a sequence of utterances such as the following: 
(12) There came a car from the left and a car from the right. 
Which car hit the bike? - The one from the left. 
The alternative raised by the question is between the two cars, and 
the focus of the answer is ‘the one from the left’. But obviously, this car has 
already been introduced, just as everything else in the answer: it is 
‘maintained information’. This is clearly reflected in the form in which it is 
referred to in the utterance. The rest of the answer is a repetition of the 
expression of the topic. 
The quaestio answered by an individual utterance may also be 
derived from the ‘higher’quaestio of a whole text, to which the utterance 
belongs and which the text in its entirety is intended to answer. In this case, 
there may be global constraints what belongs to the topic component and to 
the focus component of the individual utterances. Take a question such as 
‘What happened to you last week?’ which elicits a narrative text. It asks for 
the specification of some complex event, which the speaker may subdivide 
into a series of sub-events, each of them happening during some time 
interval ti within the time of the total event. Thus, the quaestio of the whole 
text can be broken down into a temporal sequence of quaestiones answered 
by all of those utterances which specify one of the subevents, roughly 
1: What happened to you at t1? 
2: What happened to you at t2? 
3: What happened to you at t3? 
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n: What happened to you at tn? 
For each individual utterance, we have a time span which belongs to the 
topic component of this utterance. These time spans need not be 
individually specified, they follow from a general principle - the ‘topic 
condition’ of narrative texts. This condition gives us the ‘backbone’ of the 
narrative, its main structure. It may be interrupted at any point by utterances 
which do not answer the general quaestio but rather subquaestiones such as 
‘What did you think of this?, What's the point?, Would you do this 
yourself? Are you sure?’, etc., which all lead to side structures of different 
type. The specification of a particular side structure may also extend over 
several utterances. For example, a narrative sequence can be interrupted by 
a descriptive sequence, or vice versa. 
Suppose now you happen to be the victim of the traffic accident, and 
the quaestio is ‘What happened to you after you saw the car?’ It specifies a 
time span, which is after the time span of the previously mentioned event. It 
also specifies a person, the addressee in this case (‘to you’), and moreover it 
indicates that what is asked for is an event, not a state, as would be the case 
with the question ‘What was the situation at that time?’ Hence, the quaestio 
narrows down the focus of the answer to include only those events which 
could have happened to the addressee during the intervening time since the 
event reported before. The answer, which settles the alternative can repeat 
the topic (fully or in part); it can also elaborate on it. But it must contain a 
part which expresses the focus, that is, which specifies an event that meets 
the conditions mentioned above. This has many consequences for the 
structure of the utterance. If, for instance, the topic time - the temporal 
interval about which something is said - is expressed by an adverbial, the 
protagonist by a noun phrase, and the event in the narrower sense by a 
verb, and if furthermore the language in question has a rule ‘topic 
expression before focus expression’, then a word order such as ‘noun 
phrase - verb - adverbial’: the verb must be last. This may conflict with 
purely syntactic constraints on word order, such as ‘the verb is in second 
position’, and different languages have found different ways to solve 
competing requirements of this type. Intonation, special particles, cleft 
constructions, passives, etc., or by simply not requiring consistent marking 
of what is focus and what is topic in these cases. Thus, the speaker’s 
structural choice is narrowed down by two factors: first, by the structural 
potential of the language, and second, by the quaestio. In section 4.3, we 
shall come back to this point. 
3.3 Domains of reference within an utterance 
Any proposition - that is, the content of a full sentence - is a web of 
meaning components or ‘referents’, as we shall say here. These are of 
various kinds - spatial, temporal, personal, modal etc. Ever since the days of 
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the Greek philosophers, there have been innumerable proposals to 
categorize various domains of referents. It is useful to distinguish at least 
the following five: 
a. time spans 
b. places 
c. persons and objects 
d. states, events, properties 
e. modalities, such as the ‘possible’, ‘real’, ‘necessary’, ‘fictitious’, etc.; this 
should also include other characterisations by which the speaker indicates 
a particular subjective attitude to what he expresses. 
An utterance selects referents from these domains and integrates them into a 
whole, the proposition. This is not done arbitrarily; it follows certain 
principles. Most typically, an element from the domain ‘persons and 
objects’ is combined with an element from the domain ‘states, events, 
properties’ to form the ‘inner core’ of the proposition; this inner core is then 
located in time and space. The resulting combination of referents is then 
provided with a modality which, in one way or the other, fixes its reality 
status. This simple picture can be complicated in various ways. Not all 
domains of reference must be represented; it does not make much sense to 
associate a proposition such as the one seventeen is a prime number with a 
place. On the other hand, a particular domain of reference may be 
repeatedly represented (for example, there may be several protagonists of 
the action; similarly, a sentence may involve more than a single time span 
and a single place). Therefore, the result may be a very complex structure of 
referents from these five domains, brought about by the speaker’s 
contextual, structural and lexical choice. What the quaestio does, is to 
impose constraints on these choices, and thus, on L-perspectivation. It 
defines, for example, a time frame, about which the speaker is asked to say 
something; but it is up to the speaker to deal with this time frame: he may 
choose to speak about the entire time frame, he may split into subintervals, 
he can leave these implicit or mark them by tense or adverbials, etc. Very 
often, the quaestio also introduces a vantage point in relation to which the 
speaker is supposed to describe the various referents. Take, for example, a 
‘court question’, such as ‘What did you observe from where you were?’. It 
defines the speaker, sets a temporal frame and a place (time and position of 
the speaker during the intake phase). Moreover, it also imposes a certain 
‘modality‘ on what the speaker is to express. In this example, he is 
supposed to make assertive statements. But the modality is not ‘real with 
respect to the event’ - it is ‘real with respect to the speaker’s visual 
perception of the event during the intake’. This would be different, if the 
quaestio were ‘What happened at that time?’. Here, the constraints on the 
speaker’s possible choices are much weaker; it would be up to him to 
indicate crucial features of his perspective. He might say, for example: 
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From where I stood, I had the impression that..., thus defining himself his 
place and the subjective commitment on the reality status of what is 
described. 
3.4 Referential movement 
Referential movement is the way in which information from the five 
domains of reference shifts from one utterance to the next. Suppose that 
there are two subsequent utterances A and B, in which the proposition 
consists of just one referent from each of the five domains. This gives the 
following picture of possible referential movements. 
(13) A: MODa TIMEa SPACEa PERSONa PREDICATEa 
B: MODb TIMEb SPACEb PERSONb PREDICATEb 
In principle, each referent in B can be maintained from A or freshly 
introduced in B. In reality, the possibilites are much finer; but in the present 
context, we will only illustrate the way in which the quaestio constrains 
referential movement (for a detailed discussion, see von Stutterheim 1997; 
Kohlmann 1997). If the quaestio is ‘What happened at that time?’, then 
MOD in general is defined as ‘real’; it remains constant throughout the text 
- unless the speaker explicitly chooses to deviate from it (see below section 
3.5). As for TIME, the quaestio sets a temporal frame which the speaker is 
expected to deal with. Typically, he would subdivide this time frame into 
smaller time spans, which are sequentially ordered. Hence, TIMEb is after 
TIMEa. This is automatically given by the ‘topic condition’ on narratives 
mentioned above. Again, the speaker may deviate from this condition, thus 
giving raise to side structures or to special rhetorical effects. But if he 
remains within the frame defined by the quaestio, he is still free to choose 
the structural and lexical means by which to express this temporal shift. The 
quaestio does not impose any constraint on what the protagonists are. 
Hence, the speaker is free with respect to all three types of choice. He can 
introduce what he wants to, he can maintain what he wants to, in whichever 
form he wants to. Space is again not explicitly fixed by the quaestio: Note 
however, that in this case, a spatial frame may be implicitly included: the 
speaker is not supposed to speak about anything that might have happened 
at that time, but about what happened at that time at some particular place, 
and his freedom in introducing and maintaining spatial referents is limited 
to that place. As for the final domain predicate, all that is predetermined by 
the quaestio, is that it must be ‘happenings’, rather than, for example, visual 
properties or states. Otherwise, the speaker is completely free in what he 
chooses to introduce and to maintain in a particular utterance. 
3.5 Deviating from the quaestio 
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In section 1, we introduced the idea that L-perspectivising can be described 
in terms of various choices which the special has to make in a given 
communicative situation - structural choice, lexical choice, contextual 
choice. In this section, it was discussed how the quaestio limits these 
choices and hence narrows down the ways in which the speaker can say 
what he intends to say. Hence, the quaestio is principled constraint on 
possible perspectives; it is not the only one, and others will be discussed in 
section 4. It is up to the speaker to which extent he accepts the constraints 
defined by the quaestio. He may, to begin with, reject the entire 
communicative task, at the risk of more or less severe social consequences. 
He may also take on the task but redefine it in his own sense, for example 
by telling a long-winded story instead of giving an argument, when an 
argument was asked for. These are radical deviations from the quaestio. 
What is more interesting are „local deviations“; they occur when the speaker 
accepts the quaestio and its constraints in principle, but violates them from 
time to time. There are two such cases. First, the speaker might include a 
full utterance, or even a sequence of utterances, which is not an answer to 
the quaestio. This leads to what has been called ‘side-structures’. From a 
communicative point of view, they may be no less important than the main-
structure utterances. In particular, they allow the speaker to express his 
personal views on what is told in answer to the question, and in this sense, 
they are important for L-perspectivation. The other case are small deviations 
within a main-structure utterance. The speaker may, for example, initially 
accept the position imposed on him by the question, but they present the 
entire story from a different vantage point. Normally, such changes must be 
explicitly marked. Suppose, for example, the question was: ‘What did you 
observe from your position?’ Then, the speaker is actually bound to a 
particular position, to a particular time and to a particular type of 
information he is allowed to report: the incidents he has observed. He then 
may start with a series of utterances which do exactly this, and then switch 
to something he has heard, or something he has observed later, or he may 
say something that he has not observed but simply inferred. Deviations of 
this sort give a particular flavour to the way in which the task is solved; they 
are, in other words, one of the speaker’s means to indicate a particular 
perspective. This does not devalidate the constraints as imposed by the 
quaestio: It is precisely the violation of these constraints which leads to the 
specific effect. 
4. Other constraints on L-perspectivation 
L-perspectivation is analysed here in terms of constraints on lexical, 
structural and contextual choices. Many of these constraints stem from the 
quaestio. But these are not the only ones. In the following we will discuss 
the potential sources for L-perspectivation which interact with the 
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constraints set up by the quaestio. These are (a) the hearer model, and (b) 
the linguistic system used. 
4.1 The hearer model 
In planning the amount and flow of information provided as an answer to a 
particular question, the speaker has to construct a mental model of the 
hearer (Graumann and Herrmann 1989, Herrmann 1989, Herrmann and 
Grabowski 1994, Levelt 1989). This model encompasses information and 
assumptions about the hearer’s knowledge base with respect to the subject 
matter, his factual viewing point, his subjective perspective and 
expectations concerning the potential communicative content. The hearer 
model effects crucially influences the way in which the speaker constructs 
his text, with perspectivation coming into play at different levels. In the 
construction of a discourse representation, it crucially influences the two 
types of selection; it furthermore is largely responsible for the right balance 
between what is explicitly said and what is left to contextual information. 
The most obvious reflection of the hearer model is the choice of a 
particular temporal or spatial referential frame. All languages have specific 
constructions which relate the information expressed to the time of speaking 
or hearing (now, specific tense forms), to the participants of the speech 
situation (I, you, he), and to the position of these participants within the 
speech situation (here, there, or, in a more complex way, left, right, front, 
back). It is the speaker who defines what, in a given situation, should count 
as the vantage point, the origo in Bühler’s (1934) famous analysis of deixis. 
In the most elementary case, the speaker takes himself as the origo - in 
particular, his present position and the moment of his own speaking: he 
defines the perspective. But there are many complications. First, in written 
communication, it is not at all clear what should count as the moment of 
speech, or the position 
of the speaker. These two vantage points must therefore often be explicitly 
introduced (say by giving date and place at the beginning of a letter). 
Second, even in spoken communication, the speaker is free, for example, to 
choose the position of the hearer as the spatial vantage point. This is often 
observed in instructions, where terms such as turn left or put it on the blue 
block behind the red block are normally seen from the hearer’s, rather than 
the speaker’s, viewpoint. And finally, the speaker may choose an entirely 
different ‘origo’ - for example, some time in the past and the position where 
he was, or where some other person was, at that time. Such a frame can be 
set by the quaestio. If the quaestio is ‘What did you observe next?’, then left 
and right relate not to the present position of speaker or hearer but to the 
position of the speaker at that time in the past. It is a ‘Deixis am 
Phantasma’, in Bühler’s terms, and this quaestio which introduces it. Other 
quaestiones are even more complicated in this regard, for example ‘How do 
I get from here to the station?’. In answer to this familiar question, virtually 
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all speakers choose the perspective of an ‘imaginery wanderer’, i.e., deictic 
terms in the route directions relate to the permanently changing fictitious 
position of a person who moves through the streets (cf. Klein 1982). In 
other cases, the quaestio itself fixes no origo at all (‘Are physical exercises 
healthy?’), and even if it does, the speaker may occasionally deviate from it. 
The flexible choice of vantage point is one of the crucial factors in L-
perspectivation. 
A second relevant factor in contextual choice is given by the 
assumed amount of shared knowledge. Here again, we can look back at a 
rather comprehensive research tradition (see the survey in Stutterheim and 
Kohlmann 1998). Studies on communication between interlocutors with 
different states of knowledge, such as experts and novices or adults and 
children, have shown that speakers construct different texts depending on 
what they take to be shared knowledge. Knowing more or less about a 
particular subject matter means that the potential maximal amount of 
knowledge is only presented in parts. As we have argued above, selective 
knowledge representation is always based on processes of perspectivation. 
An adaptation to the hearer’s perspective in this respect surfaces in different 
forms. It can be the determining factor for what is taken as the global level 
of granularity in a text. Usually, the quaestio does not predetermine at what 
level of specificity a speaker should provide information. In order to 
produce a consistent globally structured text the speaker has to take a choice 
with respect to the degree of granularity. One factor that governs this choice 
is the adaptation to the hearer. The scaffolding force of this globally 
established perspective can be seen in cases where the speaker deviates 
intentionally from this perspective. He is then led to use specific linguistic 
devices to mark the local nature of this change. Further evidence comes 
from cases where changes are required in the course of text production. If, 
for instance, the hearer requires a change of this parameter, the speaker 
cannot easily restructure his text without loosing track altogether (cf. 
v.Stutterheim/Kohlmann 1998). 
A third domain in which perspectivation is determined by the hearer 
model are constellations in which the quaestio leaves certain options 
unspecified, and the choice is led by what, in the speaker’s mind could 
make understanding easier for the hearer. Consider, for example, a quaestio 
which asks for the description of some highly complex configuration of 
entities. One of the speaker’s tasks is then to find an appropriate 
linearisation strategy. The speaker has different options how to connect the 
entities involved spatially: he can introduce an imaginary person, who walks 
from entity to entity or he can anchor the entities within some abstract 
referential frame by means of deictic or intrinsic relations. Which option a 
speaker will choose is – besides other factors such as the nature of the 
configuration described – dependent on the hearer model. 
So far we have only looked at the role of the hearer model for one 
componentent of L-perspectivation - contextual choice. There are also 
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effects on lexical choice which can be traced back to this factor. The 
speakers may select a particular lexical item among equivalent ones, 
because they want to impress the hearer, but also because they feel that it is 
particularly appropriate for the hearer: they base their lexical choice not only 
on their own lexical repertoire but also on the alleged lexical repertoire of 
the hearer (E. Clark 1997). A particularly striking case is the adaptation to 
non-native hearers. Similar adaptations are possible but less often observed 
for structural choice - except again in communication with non-native 
interlocutors. 
Summarizing we can say that the factor hearer model implies 
perspectivation along different dimensions some of which operate at one 
level with the globally established quest-constraints, some specifying 
options opened by the quaestio, some concerning local decisions such as 
lexical choice. 
4.2 Linguistic system 
When confronted with a particular subject matter and quaestio, speakers of 
different languages show different preferences for perspectivation of the 
communicative content (Carroll 1993, Slobin 1991, Talmy 1988). This is 
not surprising given that languages encode perspective at all levels of the 
linguistic system. Some of the linguistic means which require 
perspectivation for their use have been mentioned already. There are 
phonological means such as stress and intonation patterns which are applied 
on the basis of processes of perspectivation; morphological devices which 
encode perspectivity in relation to temporal, spatial and modal categories. 
Then there are syntactic structures which require perspectivation for their 
use such as word order in some languages, subordination or phrasal 
structures (prepositional phrases versus adverbials with respect to the 
explicitness of the reference object). Languages differ in what type of 
perspective is frozen in the system and how it is distributed across the range 
of the different devices. For processes of conceptualisation a relevant 
distinction is given by the fact that some of these devices are obligatory in 
nature (e.g. verbal morphology, word order) others can be chosen 
depending on the specific communicative intention. 
This leads us to the following question. Is it the case that the 
respective linguistic system induces specific perspectives on the 
informational structure to be communicated? In order to pursue this 
question we have to look at texts which have been produced by speakers of 
different languages under conditions which otherwise remain constant. 
Studies of this type have been carried out for several languages. We will 
focus on the language pair English – German, the domain of interest lying 
on the differences between the two verbal systems. 
A crucial contrast between the English and the German verb is 
related to the notion of aspect. English requires obligatory marking of aspect 
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whereas German has no such device. In English, this goes along with a rich 
repertoire of phasal verbs, such as to start, to keep on, to get to, which is 
extensively used. German has forms of this type in its lexicon, but the field 
is less differentiated, and phase markers are not high in frequency. 
Generally one can say that English provides a rich and structurally diverse 
repertoire for expressing the phasal structure of events. German, on the 
other hand, has no obligatory grammatical devices for this semantic 
category nor is the lexicon in this domain as rich as in English. 
Let us now look at complex language productions by English and 
German speakers with respect to the temporal perspective under which 
events are presented and the function of the respective devices in context. 
The texts used as data base are film retellings elicited by a very general 
quaestio: ‘Please tell me, what happened in the film?’ As regards the level 
and type of event segmentation there are no constraints set by the quaestio. 
The speaker has to decide which event to select for verbalisation and how to 
present this event. Here we are only interested in temporal perspectivation. 
In order to describe temporal structures in texts we will draw upon the 
notion of topic time as developed in Klein (1994). Topic time is defined as 
the time interval for which an assertion is made. Whereas the event time, 
that is the time for which an event holds, is objectively fixed, the topic time 
selected in a given utterance is a matter of choice. We can therefore say that 
one central type of temporal perspectivation lies in the selection of a 
specific relation between topic time and event time.1 
This relation always has to be decided upon by the speaker which 
means that this type of perspectivation is part of what has been described as 
obligatory choices in constructing a complex informational structure. Given 
that a particular event is selected for verbalisation, what are the temporal 
perspectives under which the speaker can present it? He can either look at 
an event holistically with the topic time including the time of the event: 
dann gräbt er ein Loch (e1) und da fällt er hinein (e2) (then he digs a hole 
and there he falls into). In e1 the topic time interval is given as the post time 
of some preceding event, marked by the temporal shifter dann, the event 
time lies completely within this time interval, the same pattern shows in the 
second utterance. Here the topic time is implicitly given as post time of e1 
and the time of e2 lies completely within this interval. Typically this 
temporal perspective goes along with a certain aspect of completeness with 
respect to the event described. As in the example given above, both events 
are specified for a point of completion, in this case in the spatial domain. 
Another possibility for refering to completion of an event lies in referring to 
effected objects as in er malt ein Haus. 
This holistic view of a situation can be contrasted with a view which 
segments events into phases. Under this perspective the topic time 
established overlaps with parts of the event time. The speaker can choose an 
inchoative aspect expressed in utterances such as he starts to dig a hole or 
he starts digging a hole with a further subtle distinction in perspective 
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concerning the degree of overlap between topic time and event time. 
Another option lies in an imperfective perspecitivation: he is digging in the 
sand. Here the topic time lies within the time of the situation. Note that the 
choice of this temporal perspective often goes along with presenting the 
event without a point of completion - in contrast to what has been said about 
a holistic perspective above. The last systematic option is given by the 
perfective aspect which places the topic time after the time of situation: he 
has dug a hole. 
When we now look at how speakers of English and German 
speakers proceed in perspectivising events we find a systematic contrast. In 
the English texts an overall perspective is chosen which establishes a 
temporal viewing point as a deictic origo to which events are related in a 
very differentiated manner. Speakers present events segmented in their 
temporal phases each one hooked up to the origo rather than related 
intrinsically to each other. German speakers in contrast follow exactly the 
latter pattern by linking topic times to event times in the flow of the event 
chain, as demonstrated above. This implies a holistic or perfective view on 
the events since temporal boundaries of the event times are needed in order 
to function as a boundary for the topic time of the following event. This 
contrast in temporal perspective implies a number of further differences in 
conceptualising the content to be verbalised such as the explicit presentation 
of components such as spatial reference or effected objects versus their 
suppression in overt text. 
Speakers of German and English clearly prefer one over the other 
pattern in the way outlined above. How can these differences be accounted 
for? Obviously there is an interrelation between the linguistic devices 
available for the speakers, in that the German speaker cannot draw upon an 
aspectual verbal system. On the other hand the interrelation between 
linguistic structure and information organisation in text cannot be that 
simple. German provides means to express phasal structures of events, only 
not morphological means but lexical forms. The interesting fact, however, is 
that speakers hardly makes use of these forms because the global 
perspective chosen does not induce phasal segmentation! One possible 
explanation for this intricate interrelation between linguistic structure and 
perspectivation could lie in the eminent role of obligatory linguistic 
categories for conceptualisation. Whereas the attention of a learner of 
English is drawn to aspectual properties of events (cf. Berman/Slobin 1994) 
this not a prominent category for the German learning child. This in turn 
could lead to preferences in perspectivising situations for linguistic 
represenation: the patterns we have observed for the adult speakers. These 
patterns at the level of conceptualisation can again induce language change 
in that those forms which are used very frequently, e.g. the phasal verbs in 
English, might in the end turn into new morphological markers. 
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5. Linguistic reflection of perspective management: the case of 
subordination 
In this section, we will illustrate for one type of constructional device how 
the principles outlined above are operating in actual text production. This 
device is subordination. Since paratactic and hypotactic forms can be 
referentially equivalent, motivation to use a subordinated construction 
cannot come from the ,substance‘ encoded, but reflects particular 
perspectual choices. Based on the results of comprehensive empirical 
studies (Carroll 1997, v.Stutterheim 1997) it will be shown that 
subordination serves one very general function: it is the most prominent 
means to maintain a globally established perspective by excluding 
information which deviates from this perspective from the main body of the 
text. 
Semantically, subordination is a constructive device to exclude a 
proposition from assertion (Frege). This is also reflected in formal 
properties of hypotactic constructions which in many languages are reduced 
forms of main sentences as regards finitness, subject realisation, etc. With 
respect to its function within textual structure one can say that subordinated 
information is – metaphorically spoken – backstaged a classical domain of 
perspectivation. 
What is behind this metaphor will be shown for one central domain of 
perspectivation: the topic – focus structure as it is predetermined by the 
quaestio and specified by further globally functioning factors. 
Let us take up what has been said about the global determination of 
topic-focus-structure above. The constraints set up for topic-focus 
partitioning of a text can basically be of two different types. On the one 
hand, they concern the determination of particular referential domains as 
parts of the topic or focus component including cases in which specific 
references are established as topic elements (substantial topic constraints). 
On the other hand, they determine specific structural properties of the text, 
here we speak about topic conditions. In what follows we will give 
examples for both types of constraints and their relevance for selecting 
subordination as an expressive device (cf. v. Stutterheim 1997). 
Substantial topic constraints 
One of the perspectives to be chosen in a narrative concerns the viewing 
point from which the events are presented. A well known choice is the one 
between narrator‘s and protagonist’s perspective. Given that a story 
involves several important acting characters the speaker may select one as 
the protagonist or introduce several characters as being potential candidates 
for that role. Looking at film renarrations in which exactly this choice is 
opened up we find a very systematic pattern. If the speaker chooses a 
perspective which is anchored in relation to one protagonist, he will refer to 
events in which other characters take the role of the agent by means of 
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subordination, as in 14: 
(14) er beobachtet eine Frau, die gerade erwischt wird, weil sie 
ein Brot geklaut hat 
(he observes a woman who is being caught because she has 
stolen a piece of bread) 
und sagt zu der Polizei, die sie geschnappt hat... 
and says to the police man, who has caught her..) 
This examples shows that subordination is not only a backgrounding device 
in the sense of Hopper (1979), but it is also used for foregrounded events in 
order to keep the hearer’s attention with the global topic candidate of the 
text. 
Let us look at another case. Instructions answering a question of the type ‘ 
how has x to be done?’ show a very clear global topic/focus distribution. In 
our particular case speakers have to instruct a hearer how to put building 
blocks together to get a particular object configuration. Here we can say that 
the objects to be manipulated belong to the topic domain, what has to be 
specified is the location of these objects. Spatial references therefore form 
the focus component of the text. A typical utterance in these texts would 
have the following form: 
(15) du steckst den lila Ring auf die grüne Schraube 
(you put the purple ring onto the green screw) 
Besides the information about the actions the speaker might have to 
specify the objects involved in certain cases. This can be required for the 
object to be manipulated as well as for the object functioning as reference 
object in the locational phrase. As regards the linguistic packaging we get a 
very systematic picture. Information specifying the affected object is more 
often paratactically integrated, whereas information specifying the reference 
object is always subordinated by a relative clause, e.g.: 
(16) du steckst die grüne Schraube durch den roten Würfel, der 
über dem gelben sitzt... 
(you put the green screw through the red die, which is 
located above the yellow one) 
We explain this absolutely regular pattern in languge use across a large 
number of speakers again as resulting from global perspectivation. The 
speaker wants to maintain what has been established as focus component in 
the text. If he made the object reference expressed in this component topic 
element in its own rights by refering to it in subject position in a main 
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clause, he would change the globally estblished perspective. The use of a 
hypotactic construction in this case signals the hearer that this shift of 
perspective is only a local one without implications for the following text. 
A parallel phenomenon can be observed in route directions and 
descriptions of spatial configurations. Here we get somewhat a mirror image 
of topic/focus distribution and consequently also a mirror image of what is 
presented in paratactic versus hypotactic form. 
(17) route direction 
dann gehst du auf die Kirche zu, die am Ende der Straße zu 
sehen ist... 
(then you approach the church, which can be seen at the end 
of the street) 
description 
wenn man weiter runtergeht da steht rechts in der Mitte eine 
Kirche... 
(if you walk down there is a church to the right in 
the middle) 
Depending on the constraints set up by the quaestio the speaker has to 
provide different types of information in main structure utterances. The 
route direction require information on paths with spatial reference forming 
the focus component. Further specification of objects introduced as 
reference objects implies – just as in the case of the instructions outlined 
above – changing the topic-focus pattern established globally. Descriptions, 
on the other hand, require information on relative object positions. If the 
speaker chooses to draw upon an imaginary wanderer then this introduces a 
dynamic perspective which forms a contrast to the global perspective 
established by the quaestio. 
The use of hypotactic forms reflects exactly this difference beween 
the two text types. In the roue directions, object specification in the form of 
relative clauses is systematically subordinated, in descriptions reference to 
the motion events is almost exceptionless subordinated. Again, we see the 
function of this syntactic device in maintaining the global perspective by 
excluding information constructed from a different perspective from the 
chain of asserted propositions. 
Structural topic constraints 
As has been explained above, the linearisation principle underlying the 
sequential ordering of information in text production can be interpreted as 
global topic condition. This, in turn, implies a particular perspective under 
which the single components of the overall referential structure are related 
to each other. 
Looking again at empirical data, we find that subordination serves 
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the function to integrate information which violates this global constraint. 
Taking texts which follow a spatial linearisation principle, e.g. descriptions, 
subordination is used where the speaker locally deviates from this pattern. 
If, for instance, he switches to an object-oriented linearisation strategy -
often linked to a change of the level of granularity – then this is expressed 
by use of hypotactic forms. 
(18) daneben ist ein Cafe, das über einem Schuhladen ist und 
dicke rote Vorhänge hat... 
(next to it is a cafe, which is above a shoe shop and has thick 
red curtains) 
A parallel pattern can be observed in temporally linearised texts, which 
follow a chronological order. Violation of the principle of temporal 
sequencing is also frequently „put aside“ by means of subordination. 
Another structural aspect which is subject to perspectivation is the 
level of granularity chosen at text level. Here the same pattern emerges 
across different text types. Speaker subordinate information which imply a 
local change of the level of granularity. Again we cannot say that 
information of this kind is part of background information, but it is 
backstaged for reasons of perspective – continuity. 
To summarise what has been found about the functional motivation 
of subordination we come to the following conclusions. In order to construct 
a consistent information structure as an answer to a quaestio the speaker has 
to establish and maintain certain parameters which allow him to locally 
proceed in selecting and contouring the single informational units. As has 
been argued, taken perspectives is one crucial component in this planning 
process. It has also been made clear that these globally set perspectives 
function as default values, which means that the speaker is free to deviate 
from them. In order to meet both demands – maintainance of global 
perspectives and integration of alternative perspectives – the speaker can 
draw upon means which openly mark something like a hierarchy of 
perspectives. Subordination is one of these devices. It prevents the hearer 
from being led to global changes in perspective where only a local detour is 
intended. This function is further supported by the fact that information 
which completely leaves the referential frame of the text usually is not 
presented in subordinated form (e.g. comments, explanations). Here there is 
in a way no competition between the newly introduced perspective and the 
globally established one. Only if the grounds are set to possibly take another 
point of view on the subject matter the speaker has to make explicit which 
line he intends to follow by using the respective devices. 
6. Conclusions 
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Not many concepts in the social sciences are so appropriate for metaphorical 
extension than ‘perspective’. We do not want to belittle the heuristic, and 
even the explanatory, value of such extensions from visual perception to, for 
example, the way in which certain facts are evaluated by people of varying 
social background (‘from the perspective of a street worker’, ‘from the 
perspective of an unemployed widow in Calcutta’). Quite to the opposite: it 
is not accidental that we feel these extensions of the term to be so 
suggestive. But at one point, it must be made clear, what is specific to 
‘perspective’ and ‘perspectivation’ in a particular field. In the paper, we 
have tried to do this for L-perspectivation - for the way in which natural 
language allows its speakers to express a certain perspective. It was argued 
that this is essentially a matter of three choices which the speaker must 
permanently make in the course of his production process: lexical choice, 
structural choice, contextual choice. All three choices, and hence the 
speaker’s L-perspectivation, is constrained by a number of interacting 
factors. The most important of these is the ‘quaestio’ which the speaker sets 
out to answer. Others include adaptation to the hearer and the specific 
possibilities of the language in question. This list is surely not exhaustive. 
We only looked in passing at the role of the speaker’s subjective attitude, 
because it may lead to ‘side-structures’ in his text. But subjective attitudes 
also influence the lexical choice independent of the particular quaestio, and 
it may well be that this influence follows certain principles. But their 
investigation is primarily a matter of social and emotional psychology, 
rather than of linguistics. It is the linguistic constraints on L-perspectivation 
that were discussed here; these constraints are often strong; but they do not 
determine the speaker’s choice. 
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Another possibility for establishing a temporal perspective lies in the choice 
of an origo for anchoring the referential frame. In the unmarked case this is 
given by the deictic origo, the time of utterance, but as already described in 
Bühler (1934) the origo can be shifted along different dimensions (cf. in 
detail Klein 1994). 
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